"In an earlier study of the evolution of elements of legal organization, a Guttman scale was developed having as scale steps (elements of legal organization) counsel, police, and mediation. In this study, one further step, that of courts, is discussed, and a new Guttman scale for legal evolution presented."

This study examines why conflict emerges and how societies resolve it. The authors posit that increasing societal scale and differentiation create more potential for conflict but also more complex forms of conflict resolution. Analysis supports this theory, showing that measures of cultural complexity are positively associated with legal mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Using empirical data and statistical methodology, Gouldner and Peterson aim to identify fundamental dimensions across societies, examine the relationships among these dimensions, and evaluate their importance. Data analysis is largely based on factor analysis, and the authors discuss how statistical methods fit into functional social theory.

This study investigates the relationship between societal complexity and familial complexity. Results suggest that the relationship is somewhat curvilinear; that is, in simpler societies more societal complexity is associated with a larger familial system, but the most developed societies have smaller familial systems. The demographic, economic, and politcal correlates of maximum family size are discussed.

This paper seeks to understand how the conflict resolution strategies of indigenous and non-indigenous groups differ in their efficacy. The authors suggest that indigenous methods of conflict resolution are more effective than non-indigenous methods by demonstrating that subjects from the Outline of Cultural Materials (OCM) associated with indigenous conflict management (ICM) will co-occur less frequently with OCM terms related to conflict than subjects related to non-ICM. They tested this by selecting OCM subjects that they felt best represented ICM, non-ICM, and instances of conflict and using chi-square tests to show how often these subjects co-occurred. They subsequently split up the "conflict" variable into four forms of conflict in order to show whether any of these forms might be more frequently found associated with ICM or non-ICM subjects. The results showed that conflict subjects were more likely to co-occur with non-ICM subjects, and that sociocultural/interpersonal conflicts were more likely to be associated with ICM subjects, whereas political conflicts were more likely to be associated with non-ICM subjects.

This paper investigates two mechanisms of cultural evolution: peaceful diffusion and warlike migration. Two societies, one for each mechanism, were compared to a base society on 11 culture traits. Eight of the 11 traits diffused more readily through peaceful borrowing than through warlike migration. The authors conclude that eliminating warlike migration would slow cultural evolution but that peaceful borrowing is a favored mechanism for culture contact and change.

This paper adds to a body of research which analyzes the persistence of institutional features in societies over time by testing for association between local democracy (succession by consensus among preindustrial groups) and various measures of democracy in contemporary societies. The researchers conclude that beliefs and values which perceive democracy as a viable political structure may be an important mediating mechanism in producing and maintaining democratic instututions over time.

This book examines naming practices cross-culturally. The author posits that naming practices help to both reflect and create conceptions of personal identity. Several correlations between name meanings and practices and various sociocultural variables are presented.

Feuding and other responses to malfeasance are examined cross-culturally. The geographic distribution of responses are presented and odds ratios/logistic regression models are employed in analyzing the effect of socio-economic, historical and ecological variables on responses to malfeasance. Codes are included.

This article investigates how superordinate justice (whereby officials can arbitrate disputes involving homicide) and superordinate punishment (whereby officials can punish perpetrators of homicide) affect the level of internal violence in preindustrial societies. Results suggest that these two types of superordinate power do deter violent fatalities but that overall, “in order to increase violence substantively, arbitration authority over killings must be backed up by the power to penalize” (395).