Considerable disagreement exists in regard to the origin and distribution of economic phenomena such as money, slavery, markets, exchange, and imbalanced transfers. Here the author utilizes a worldwide cross-cultural sample of 60 pre-industrial "societies" to empirically test many economic hypotheses, with a focus on distributional mechanisms and institutions.

Considerable disagreement exists in regard to the origin and distribution of economic phenomena such as money, slavery, markets, exchange, and imbalanced transfers. Here the author utilizes a worldwide cross-cultural sample of 60 pre-industrial "societies" to empirically test many economic hypotheses, with a focus on distributional mechanisms and institutions.

This book is a comparative study of the ways in which work is organized among non-industrial societies in the production of material goods. Two general hypotheses guide the author's work: (1) The structure of any work organization is influenced by both techonological processes and social setting, and (2) The structure of any reward system is influenced by the characteristics of the work organization, the social setting, and the limits imposed by features of the technological processes. Several predictions are presented and all are supported.

Considerable disagreement exists in regard to the origin and distribution of economic phenomena such as money, slavery, markets, exchange, and imbalanced transfers. Here the author utilizes a worldwide cross-cultural sample of 60 pre-industrial "societies" to empirically test many economic hypotheses, with a focus on distributional mechanisms and institutions.

Considerable disagreement exists in regard to the origin and distribution of economic phenomena such as money, slavery, markets, exchange, and imbalanced transfers. Here the author utilizes a worldwide cross-cultural sample of 60 pre-industrial "societies" to empirically test many economic hypotheses, with a focus on distributional mechanisms and institutions.

Considerable disagreement exists in regard to the origin and distribution of economic phenomena such as money, slavery, markets, exchange, and imbalanced transfers. Here the author utilizes a worldwide cross-cultural sample of 60 pre-industrial "societies" to empirically test many economic hypotheses, with a focus on distributional mechanisms and institutions.

This book is a comparative study of the ways in which work is organized among non-industrial societies in the production of material goods. Two general hypotheses guide the author's work: (1) The structure of any work organization is influenced by both techonological processes and social setting, and (2) The structure of any reward system is influenced by the characteristics of the work organization, the social setting, and the limits imposed by features of the technological processes. Several predictions are presented and all are supported.

This book is a comparative study of the ways in which work is organized among non-industrial societies in the production of material goods. Two general hypotheses guide the author's work: (1) The structure of any work organization is influenced by both techonological processes and social setting, and (2) The structure of any reward system is influenced by the characteristics of the work organization, the social setting, and the limits imposed by features of the technological processes. Several predictions are presented and all are supported.

Researchers investigated the variation of land tenure systems across forager societies using the economic defensibility model. The study attempted to explain the variation in tenure systems across 30 hunter-gatherer societies. Using data on defense and sharing of resources among groups, and indicators of resource density, resource predictability, and competition for resources, the researchers were unable to explain the variation. This study highlights the vast range of diversity and complexity of foragers subsistence strategies, and proposes that it may be more telling to conceptualize tenure systems among hunter-gatherer societies as assemblages of multiple property regimes. While there was no overall evidence that environmental variables of resource density and predictability explain variation in tenure systems, researchers did find that increasing population density, and greater competition for resources leads to greater territoriality.

Researchers investigated the variation of land tenure systems across forager societies using the economic defensibility model. The study attempted to explain the variation in tenure systems across 30 hunter-gatherer societies. Using data on defense and sharing of resources among groups, and indicators of resource density, resource predictability, and competition for resources, the researchers were unable to explain the variation. This study highlights the vast range of diversity and complexity of foragers subsistence strategies, and proposes that it may be more telling to conceptualize tenure systems among hunter-gatherer societies as assemblages of multiple property regimes. While there was no overall evidence that environmental variables of resource density and predictability explain variation in tenure systems, researchers did find that increasing population density, and greater competition for resources leads to greater territoriality.