Kinship, Cooperation, and the Evolution of Moral Systems
The Quarterly Journal of Economics • Vol/Iss. 134(2) • Oxford University Press • Oxford • Published In • Pages: 953-1019 •
By Enke, Benjamin
Hypothesis
According to the model, societies with historically tight kin relationships will regulate cooperation through shared moral values, revenge, emotions of external shame, and notions of purity and disgust.
Note
Due to being determined by way of a model there are is no coefficient or significance provided
| Test Name | Support | Significance | Coefficient | Tail |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNKNOWN | Supported | UNKNOWN | UNKNOWN | UNKNOWN |
| Variable Name | Variable Type | OCM Term(s) |
|---|---|---|
| Shared Moral Values | Dependent variable | Ethics |
| Tightness/looseness of kin relationships | Independent variable | Community Structure, Extended Families, Kin Groups, Residence |
| Instances of revenge | Dependent variable | Ingroup Antagonisms |
| Emotions of external shame | Dependent variable | Social Control |
| Notions of purity and disgust | Dependent variable | Drives And Emotions |