The authors of this study globally test the culture of honor hypothesis, which proposes that societies with traditional herding practices developed value systems that encourage revenge and violence. Because their livelihood depends on a mobile asset, herders are more vulnerable to theft and may be more likely to turn to violence or aggressiveness to defend their animals. The authors found dependence on herding to be significantly associated with both past and contemporary conflict and punishment.

The authors of this study globally test the culture of honor hypothesis, which proposes that societies with traditional herding practices developed value systems that encourage revenge and violence. Because their livelihood depends on a mobile asset, herders are more vulnerable to theft and may be more likely to turn to violence or aggressiveness to defend their animals. The authors found dependence on herding to be significantly associated with both past and contemporary conflict and punishment.

The authors of this study globally test the culture of honor hypothesis, which proposes that societies with traditional herding practices developed value systems that encourage revenge and violence. Because their livelihood depends on a mobile asset, herders are more vulnerable to theft and may be more likely to turn to violence or aggressiveness to defend their animals. The authors found dependence on herding to be significantly associated with both past and contemporary conflict and punishment.

This article suggests a general theory of conflict and violence that may help explain the conditions under which internal conflict co-occur or are differentiated.

This article suggests a general theory of conflict and violence that may help explain the conditions under which internal conflict co-occur or are differentiated.

This article suggests a general theory of conflict and violence that may help explain the conditions under which internal conflict co-occur or are differentiated.

This article suggests a general theory of conflict and violence that may help explain the conditions under which internal conflict co-occur or are differentiated.

In this paper, the authors argue that polygyny creates social inequality in which economically advantaged men marry multiple women and economically disadvantaged men marry late in life or potentially never. The institution of polygyny results in a higher proportion of single men without families ("excess men"), who, the authors propose, may turn to violence to achieve higher wealth or prestige. Following this theory, the authors hypothesize that societies with more polygynous neighbors will be at higher risk for intergroup conflict, for which they find robust support. They also find that young men in polygynous societies, who are more likely to be economically disadvantaged and have less prestige, are also more likely to feel as though they are treated unequally and more ready to resort to violence, supporting the authors' theorized underlying mechanism.

In this paper, the authors argue that polygyny creates social inequality in which economically advantaged men marry multiple women and economically disadvantaged men marry late in life or potentially never. The institution of polygyny results in a higher proportion of single men without families ("excess men"), who, the authors propose, may turn to violence to achieve higher wealth or prestige. Following this theory, the authors hypothesize that societies with more polygynous neighbors will be at higher risk for intergroup conflict, for which they find robust support. They also find that young men in polygynous societies, who are more likely to be economically disadvantaged and have less prestige, are also more likely to feel as though they are treated unequally and more ready to resort to violence, supporting the authors' theorized underlying mechanism.

The article discusses the challenge of storing and transmitting accumulated cultural knowledge over generations, particularly for forager societies, who use storytelling as a way to encode their knowledge. The authors hypothesize that myth-telling rules exist in these societies to ensure high-fidelity transmission of the stories, and predict that such rules mandate proficient storytellers, low-distraction conditions, multiple individuals and generations present, error prevention and correction, audience attention maintenance, discouragement of rule violations, and incentivization of rule compliance. The authors searched forager ethnographic records for descriptions of myth performance and coded them for these features. Results indicate that rules regulating myth performance are widespread across forager cultures and reduce the likelihood of copy errors. These findings suggest that anthropogenic ratchets played a role in the emergence of cumulative culture.