Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

In this article, the authors seek to understand the trajectory of traditional political institutions in Africa and ask how these institutions have changed, if at all, due to colonial interference. They note that "institutions connect the past with the present", though the study of political institutions over time is often overlooked in discussions of institutional persistence and change despite their value to key components of governance and social stability. Thus, these authors investigate whether today's African institutions remain akin to their precolonial, institutional ancestors, and whether colonial governance strategies of indirect or direct rule employed by the British and French have impacted their persistence. They find evidence to support the endurance of traditional institutions in former British colonies (upward trend), whereas evidence for institutional destruction for former French colonies (downward trend).

In this article, the authors seek to understand the trajectory of traditional political institutions in Africa and ask how these institutions have changed, if at all, due to colonial interference. They note that "institutions connect the past with the present", though the study of political institutions over time is often overlooked in discussions of institutional persistence and change despite their value to key components of governance and social stability. Thus, these authors investigate whether today's African institutions remain akin to their precolonial, institutional ancestors, and whether colonial governance strategies of indirect or direct rule employed by the British and French have impacted their persistence. They find evidence to support the endurance of traditional institutions in former British colonies (upward trend), whereas evidence for institutional destruction for former French colonies (downward trend).

In this paper, the authors argue that polygyny creates social inequality in which economically advantaged men marry multiple women and economically disadvantaged men marry late in life or potentially never. The institution of polygyny results in a higher proportion of single men without families ("excess men"), who, the authors propose, may turn to violence to achieve higher wealth or prestige. Following this theory, the authors hypothesize that societies with more polygynous neighbors will be at higher risk for intergroup conflict, for which they find robust support. They also find that young men in polygynous societies, who are more likely to be economically disadvantaged and have less prestige, are also more likely to feel as though they are treated unequally and more ready to resort to violence, supporting the authors' theorized underlying mechanism.

In this paper, the authors argue that polygyny creates social inequality in which economically advantaged men marry multiple women and economically disadvantaged men marry late in life or potentially never. The institution of polygyny results in a higher proportion of single men without families ("excess men"), who, the authors propose, may turn to violence to achieve higher wealth or prestige. Following this theory, the authors hypothesize that societies with more polygynous neighbors will be at higher risk for intergroup conflict, for which they find robust support. They also find that young men in polygynous societies, who are more likely to be economically disadvantaged and have less prestige, are also more likely to feel as though they are treated unequally and more ready to resort to violence, supporting the authors' theorized underlying mechanism.