The economics of misbehavior, love and marriage contract enforcement

Economics Working Papers • Vol/Iss. 59 • The University of Michigan- Dearborn • Published In • Pages: 1-27 •
By Hull, Brooks

Abstract

This study examines the predictors of arranged marriage versus marriage for love. Several predictions are supported and results uphold the hypothesis that "societies promote the method of marriage contract enforcement best adapted to available production technology, incentives to misbehave, and methods of coercion."

Samples

Sample Used Coded Data Comment
HRAF Collection of Ethnography (paper/fiche)Other Researchers
Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS)Other Researchers

Hypotheses (7)

HypothesisSupported
The degree to which a woman's marriage is arranged by her family will be negatively related to the use of marriage for love (17).Supported
The degree to which a woman's marriage is arranged by her family will be negatively related to specialization of labor (17).Supported
The degree to which a woman's marriage is arranged by her family will be negatively related to labor outside the household (17).Supported
The degree to which a woman's marriage is arranged by her family will be negatively related to religious power (17).Partially supported
The degree to which a woman's marriage is arranged by her family will be positively related to family size (17).Not Supported
The degree to which a woman's marriage is arranged by her family will be positively related to the degree to which women inherit valuable goods or property (20).Not Supported
Arranged marriage for either sex is negatively related to the degree to which they control valuable assets (20).Supported
Documents and Hypotheses Filed By: Kate Cummings  Megan Farrer