This study empirically tests Durkheim’s theories of punishment in a sample of preindustrial societies. Analysis shows little support for five hypotheses derived from Durkheim’s theories. Findings indicate that in preindustrial societies, the intensity of punishment is associated with political integration, there are fewer collective definitions of crime, there is a higher likelihood of using material sanctions; additionally, slavery is likely to be an institutionalized means of punishment in societies with harsher sanctions.

This article explores differences between "tight" cultures ("have many strong norms and low tolerance of deviant behavior") and "loose" cultures ("have weak social norms and high tolerance of deviant behavior"). The tightness-looseness measure manifests in a myriad of macro and micro phenomena, from governance and religiosity to individual psychological processes. This study investigates these phenomena in modern nations rather than traditional societies. Potential ecological, historical, and socio-political predictors of tightness-looseness are also examined.

The authors of this article evaluate how the legacies of early statehood (i.e., precolonial centralized ethnic groups) in Africa continue to impact democratic governance. They find a positive relationship between early states and support for autocratic rule, especially in former British colonies that were highly centralized prior to colonization. They suggest that the transmission of political and cultural norms play an important role in the support for autocracies.

This study investigates political organization and the punishment of nonmarital sex. The author suggests that "the rules governing each type of nonmarital relationship are outgrowths of different relationships between controlling political bodies and local boundary systems."

This article investigates how superordinate justice (whereby officials can arbitrate disputes involving homicide) and superordinate punishment (whereby officials can punish perpetrators of homicide) affect the level of internal violence in preindustrial societies. Results suggest that these two types of superordinate power do deter violent fatalities but that overall, “in order to increase violence substantively, arbitration authority over killings must be backed up by the power to penalize” (395).

Authors contend that many of the differences across the 50 states can be attributed to the degree to which social entities are "tight" (have many strongly enforced rules and little tolerance to deviance) or "loose" (have few strongly enforced rules and greater tolerance for deviance). Significant correlations were found between many state characteristics and tightness-looseness.

This article examines the relationship between population size (and complexity) and the level of third-party punishment in economic games. Results demonstrate that people in larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment than people in small-scale societies.

This study tests the relationship between supernatural punishment (indexed by the importance of moralizing "high gods") and several proxy measures of cooperation. Results suggest that the presence of high gods is associated with money and credit, credit source, community size, jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community, and sanctions.

After studying Paiute society, the author postulates that sorcery may serve as a mechanism for social control in societies lacking superordinate authority justice. In this chapter, the cross-cultural results were presented.

This book investigates the evolution of military organizations and their activities. Hypotheses frequently relate military organizations to political variables. Data suggested that more politically centralized societies have more sophisticated military organizations which are more likely to be successful in conflict (though military sophistication does not appear to deter attack).