This study empirically tests Durkheim’s theories of punishment in a sample of preindustrial societies. Analysis shows little support for five hypotheses derived from Durkheim’s theories. Findings indicate that in preindustrial societies, the intensity of punishment is associated with political integration, there are fewer collective definitions of crime, there is a higher likelihood of using material sanctions; additionally, slavery is likely to be an institutionalized means of punishment in societies with harsher sanctions.

This article explores differences between "tight" cultures ("have many strong norms and low tolerance of deviant behavior") and "loose" cultures ("have weak social norms and high tolerance of deviant behavior"). The tightness-looseness measure manifests in a myriad of macro and micro phenomena, from governance and religiosity to individual psychological processes. This study investigates these phenomena in modern nations rather than traditional societies. Potential ecological, historical, and socio-political predictors of tightness-looseness are also examined.

This article proposes that integrative differences mediate the relationship between demographic size and political complexity. Hypotheses are supported by a review of previous literature.

The authors of this article evaluate how the legacies of early statehood (i.e., precolonial centralized ethnic groups) in Africa continue to impact democratic governance. They find a positive relationship between early states and support for autocratic rule, especially in former British colonies that were highly centralized prior to colonization. They suggest that the transmission of political and cultural norms play an important role in the support for autocracies.

This article examines the artistic encouragement of collective action during premodern regime building. No cross-cultural empirical hypotheses are tested, but the author identifies artistic processes that promoted the moral capacity for political commitment in a collective (rather than autocratic) polity.

This study uses Bayesian phylogenetic regression modelling across 131 largely non-industrial societies to test how variation of punishment is impacted by social, economic, and political organization. The authors focus on the presence of norm violations and types of punishments, and explores their relationships. The norm violations include adultery, rape, religious violations, food violations, and war cowardice. While the types of punishment are reputational, material, physical, or education. This study suggests a hypothesis for each type of punishment in relation to socioecological variables.

This article investigates how superordinate justice (whereby officials can arbitrate disputes involving homicide) and superordinate punishment (whereby officials can punish perpetrators of homicide) affect the level of internal violence in preindustrial societies. Results suggest that these two types of superordinate power do deter violent fatalities but that overall, “in order to increase violence substantively, arbitration authority over killings must be backed up by the power to penalize” (395).

The study looks at 137 countries and examines the relationship between disbelief in God and increased security in health, economic development and security. The findings provide additional support for the uncertainty hypothesis as there is a positive relationship between a country's health or financial growth/security and the population's disbelief in God.

This paper seeks to understand how the conflict resolution strategies of indigenous and non-indigenous groups differ in their efficacy. The authors suggest that indigenous methods of conflict resolution are more effective than non-indigenous methods by demonstrating that subjects from the Outline of Cultural Materials (OCM) associated with indigenous conflict management (ICM) will co-occur less frequently with OCM terms related to conflict than subjects related to non-ICM. They tested this by selecting OCM subjects that they felt best represented ICM, non-ICM, and instances of conflict and using chi-square tests to show how often these subjects co-occurred. They subsequently split up the "conflict" variable into four forms of conflict in order to show whether any of these forms might be more frequently found associated with ICM or non-ICM subjects. The results showed that conflict subjects were more likely to co-occur with non-ICM subjects, and that sociocultural/interpersonal conflicts were more likely to be associated with ICM subjects, whereas political conflicts were more likely to be associated with non-ICM subjects.

This article examines the relationship between population size (and complexity) and the level of third-party punishment in economic games. Results demonstrate that people in larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment than people in small-scale societies.